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Privatization and environmental policy in a mixed oligopoly*1





This paper analyzes the interaction between two political economy decisions 
by a government: whether to privatize a public firm and what environmental 
policy to choose (an environmental tax or an emission standard). We find that 
when market competition is weak the government does not privatize the public 
firm and sets an environmental tax. When it is intermediate the public firm is not 
privatized and the government sets an environmental standard. Finally, when 
market competition is strong the government privatizes the public firm and is 
indifferent between a tax and a standard.
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Resumen
Este artículo analiza la interacción entre dos decisiones de economía política que 
tiene que tomar un gobierno: si privatizar una empresa pública y qué política 
ambiental elegir (un impuesto medioambiental o un estándar de emisiones). 
Encontramos que cuando la competencia de las empresas en el mercado es 
débil, el gobierno no privatiza la empresa pública y establece un impuesto 
medioambiental. Cuando es intermedia, la empresa pública no se privatiza 
y el gobierno establece un estándar medioambiental. Finalmente, cuando la 
competencia en el mercado es fuerte, el gobierno privatiza la empresa pública 
y está indiferente entre un impuesto y un estándar.
Palabras clave: Impuesto medioambiental, estándar, oligopolio mixto, privatización
Clasificación JEL: Q58, L13, L32, H2.
1. Introduction
In many industries in current economies there is interaction between private 
and public firms. Oil, heavy manufacturing, telecommunications and tourism 
are good examples of mixed oligopolies (De Fraja, 2009). This is especially 
important in Europe, where governments still own a significant percentage of the 
firms in different sectors of industry (see Parker, 1998; Parker and Saal, 2003).
Since the 1980s there has been a worldwide wave of privatization of public 
firms (Matsumura and Shimizu, 2010). In 1979 the United Kingdom privatized 
many of its state corporations and more privatizations, albeit on a smaller scale, 
followed in the rest of the European Community in the 1980’s. In the 1990’s 
the creation of the Single Market sparked further privatization. To explain 
this evidence, the literature on mixed oligopoly has analyzed the decision by 
governments of whether to privatize a single public firm (see, for example, De 
Fraja and Delbono, 1989, 1990; Corneo and Jeanne, 1994). These papers have 
been extended to consider, among other factors, partial privatization of public 
firms (Matsumura, 1998; Lin and Matsumura, 2012), privatization and merg-
ers (Méndez-Naya, 2007, 2012), privatization of state-holding corporations 
(Bárcena-Ruiz and Garzón, 2017; Dong et al., 2018), and privatization with 
switching costs (Dong and Bárcena-Ruiz, 2017).
The above cited papers do not assume explicitly that firms pollute the envi-
ronment, so the environmental policies of governments are ignored when it is 
decided whether to privatize public firms1. However, this is an important factor 
1 Bluffstone and Panayotou (2000) analyze the decision by governments of whether to 
privatize a public firm when on-site contamination and potential environmental liabilities 
are significant. However, they do not consider that governments implement an environ-
mental policy. 
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in the privatization of public firms in mixed markets such as public airlines, 
automobile, steel, chemical, power plant, waste disposal, transportation, and so 
on, which emit pollutants in the production process. In this regard, Lovei and 
Gentry (2002) point out that evidence from Central and Eastern Europe, Latin 
America, and Asia reveals positive links between privatization of public firms 
and improved environmental performance. It is in the best interest of govern-
ments to integrate environmental issues into the privatization process in order 
to achieve sustainable outcomes. For example, Bulgaria, after the transition 
to a market economy started, privatized some of public firms and adopted the 
Environmental protection Act of 1991, which provided a new foundation for 
environmental management. In 1990 Germany privatized many public firms 
that belonged to the former East Germany. Ongoing environmental liabilities 
were transferred to the new owners. Moreover, some EU countries, such as the 
Scandinavian countries2, France, Belgium, The Netherlands and Germany, have 
privatized some of their public firms (Parker, 1998; Parker and Saal, 2003) and 
at the same time are concerned about the environment and use environmental 
policies to protect it (see European Environment Agency, 2000, 2005)3.
Since the 1990’s increasing concern over the quality of the environment has 
led governments to set environmental policies to control pollution. Economic 
literature that analyzes the environment assuming private oligopolies has studied 
optimal environmental taxes and standards under imperfect competition (Helfand, 
1999; Requate, 2006; Ohori, 2011; Bárcena-Ruiz and Campo, 2017). Helfand 
(1999) argues that if firms are identical and there is no uncertainty taxes and 
standards generate the same social welfare. However, Baumol and Oates (1988, 
ch. 4) find that taxes are superior when firms differ4. Helfand (1999) also argues 
that the greater efficiency of taxes over standards depends on several factors such 
as, for example, how standards are formulated, whether there are information 
asymmetries, and how conditions change over time5.
2 The Norwegian government uses nationalization or privatization as a tool to improve the 
environment in addition to the environmental policy. This last includes environmental 
taxes and environmental standards. For example, the fund owned by the Norwegian state 
sold its shares in Rio Tinto, the world’s second-biggest mining firm, for fear that this mine 
caused environmental damage abroad (see The Economist, January 22, 2009, available 
at: http://www.economist.com/node/12970769).
3 Another example is the steel industry in Taiwan. China Steel Corporation (CSC) is a 
state-owned corporation that competes against the private steel firm Yueh United Steel 
Corporation (YUSCO) in the domestic market. In 1995, CSC was privatized by the govern-
ment of Taiwan. The productive process of these two firms, located in Kaohsiung, pollutes 
the environment of this city and the government was very concerned about it. Thus, the 
government of Taiwan proposed green taxes to mitigate the increasing environmental 
damage (Wang et al., 2009). 
4 When firms have different abatement costs, and when the abatement level depends only 
on total emissions, abatement costs are higher with a standard than with a tax.
5 Heuson (2010) finds that taxes have a comparative advantage over standards when im-
perfect competition and uncertain abatement costs are assumed. Lahiri and Ono (2007) 
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The above papers have been extended to consider a mixed market. Wang et al. 
(2009) analyze the optimal degree of privatization in a mixed duopoly when the 
government sets environmental taxes to control pollution6. Ohori (2006) analyzes 
the same problem in an international duopoly. Naito and Ogawa (2009) show 
that in a mixed duopoly welfare under an emission standard is greater than under 
an environmental tax, regardless of the degree of partial privatization. Finally, 
Kato (2011) shows that the superiority of environmental taxes over emission 
standards in a mixed duopoly depends on the parameters of the cost functions.
In a mixed duopoly the public firm is usually not privatized since market 
competition is greatly reduced. The above cited papers analyze the environmen-
tal policies of governments assuming a mixed duopoly, so they cannot analyze 
how they affect the decision by governments to privatize public firms. In fact, 
only partial privatization can be analyzed. Thus, the objective of this paper is 
to examine the environmental policy instrument preferred by governments, in 
a mixed oligopoly, when public firms can be privatized.
To analyze the above issue we assume a single market with n private firms 
and one public firm that produce a homogeneous good with the same technology. 
The production process of the firms pollutes the environment, but producers 
have technology available for abating this pollution, and that technology is the 
same for all firms. There is a government that may set an environmental tax or 
an emission standard to control pollution and that decides whether to privatize 
the public firm or not. We find that the superiority of the environmental tax over 
the emission standard depends on the number of private firms that compete in 
the market. When that number is low the public firm is not privatized and social 
welfare is greater with an environmental tax. When the number of private firms 
takes an intermediate value the public firm is not privatized but social welfare 
is greater with an emission standard. Finally, if the number of private firms is 
high the public firm is privatized and the government is indifferent between an 
environmental tax and an emission standard.
The paper most closely related to our own is that of Kato (2011), who shows 
that in a mixed duopoly the superiority of an environmental tax over an emission 
standard depends on the parameters of the cost functions. Moreover, he obtains 
that the government does not privatize the public firm since he considers a mixed 
duopoly. We extend his work by considering a mixed oligopoly, which enables us 
to analyze the decision by governments of whether to privatize focusing on how 
that decision is affected by the environmental policy instrument chosen to control 
pollution. We find that the superiority of an environmental tax over an emission 
show that a relative emission standard is welfare-superior to an emission-equivalent tax 
when the number of firms is fixed, assuming one country and imperfect competition.
6 Bárcena-Ruiz and Garzón (2006) compare the optimal pollution tax in a mixed oligopoly 
with that chosen in a private oligopoly when domestic firms are assumed. Kato (2013) 
analyzes the optimal degree of privatization in a mixed duopoly when there is an envi-
ronmental problem but the government does not implement an environmental policy.
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standard depends on market competition, measured by the number of private 
firms competing in the market, a factor that is not considered by Kato (2011).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. 
Sections 3 and 4 analyze the decision of whether to privatize the public firm when 
the government sets an environmental tax and an emission standard, respectively. 
Section 5 shows the main result of the paper, and Section 6 draws conclusions.
2. The Model
We consider an industry made up of one public firm, denoted by firm 0, 
which competes with n private firms (n ≥ 1) producing a homogeneous good 
and that engage in Cournot competition. As usual, the public firm aims to 
maximize social welfare and private firms to maximize their own profits. If the 
public firm is privatized there are n+1 private firms in the market. The inverse 
demand function of the good is given by p = 1–Q, where p is the price of the 
good, Q = q0 + qii=1
n
∑  is the total output of industry, q0 is the output produced 
by the public firm, and qi is the amount of the good produced by private firm i, 
i = 1,…, n. Firms have the same production cost function given by C qi( ) = cqi2,  
i = 0, 1,…, n.
Each unit of output produced by the private firms and the public firm causes 
one unit of pollutant. The production by firm i generates total pollution emis-
sions ei. Producers have technology available for abating this pollution, and that 
technology is the same for all the firms. The abatement level chosen by firm 
i is denoted by ai. The pollution abatement cost function of firm i is given by 
CAi = k  ai
2,  i = 0, 1,…, n. If firm i chooses output level qi and pollution abatement 
level ai, pollutant emissions by firm i are ei = qi–ai
7. The environmental damage 





where the positive parameter d measures the valuation of the environment by 
the government.
To protect the environment the government may choose between two envi-
ronmental policy instruments: an environmental tax or an emission standard. 
In the first case the government imposes a tax, t, per unit of pollutant emitted. 
Thus, the taxes that firm i has to pay are tei, and the tax revenue collected by the 
government is T = t eii=0
n
∑ .  In the second case the government imposes a uniform 
upper bound on pollution that limits the pollutant that firms may emit, which 
is denoted by s. In that case, firms do not pay environmental taxes. Therefore, 
the profit of firm i when an environmental tax is set is:
7 It can be shown that the equilibrium pollution emissions of firm i are always positive.
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(1)   π i = 1− qi − qjj=0, j≠i
n
∑( )qi −cqi2 − tei − kai2,  i = 0,  1,…,n.
When the government sets an environmental standard, s, the firm has to 
abate all emissions above s. Thus, the profit of firm i is:
(2)  π i = 1− qi − qjj=0, j≠i
n
∑( )qi −cqi2 − k qi − s( )2 ,  i = 0,  1,…,n.
As usual, the producer and consumer surpluses are PS = π0 + π ii=1
n
∑  and 




/ 2,  respectively. The social welfare function that the gov-
ernment considers comprises the consumer surplus (CS), the producer surplus 
(PS), the pollution tax revenue (T), if any, and the environmental damage, ED. 
It is given by:
(3)  W =CS +PS +T −ED.
To analyze how different environmental policy instruments affect the gov-
ernment’s decision on privatization, we consider a three-stage game. In the first 
stage the government simultaneously decides whether to privatize the public firm 
or not, and whether to set up an environmental tax or an emission standard. If 
the public firm is privatized the market structure is a private oligopoly but if it 
is not privatized the market structure is a mixed oligopoly. In the second stage, 
given the decisions taken in the first stage, the government chooses the optimal 
tax, t, or the optimal standard, s. In the third stage firms act simultaneously and 
non-cooperatively to choose outputs and abatement levels. We solve the game by 
backward induction to obtain a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. To simplify 
the exposition of results, and with no loss of generality, we assume c = k = d = 18.
Next, we analyze the government’s decision on whether to privatize the 
public firm by assuming that the government sets an environmental tax to 
control pollution.
3. Environmental tax
Let subscript t denote that the government sets an environmental tax to 
protect the environment. This means that the case faced is that analyzed by 
Bárcena-Ruiz and Garzón (2006). We consider first that the government does 
not privatize the public firm, so there is a mixed oligopoly. In the third stage of 
the game the public firm chooses q0 and a0 to maximize the social welfare given 
8 It can be shown that the main results of the paper hold when the values of these parameters 
change.
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by (3), and each private firm i chooses qi and ai to maximize its own profit given 
by (1). Solving these problems, we obtain:
(4)  q0 =
6− 2n+ 7+ n( )nt  
4 6+ n( )
,  qi =
6− 8+ n( )t
4 6+ n( )
,  a0 =
6+ 4− 13+ 2n( )t( )n
8 6+ n( )
,  ai =
t
2
,  i =1,  …,n.
Given the number of private firms in the market, the output of the public 
firm q0 (the output of each private firm qi) increases (decreases) with the envi-
ronmental tax t. The abatement level of the public firm a0 (that of each private 
firm ai) decreases (increases) with t. In order to increase social welfare the public 
firm increases its output and reduces its abatement level, which further reduces 
the output produced by each private firm since outputs are strategic substitutes.
In the second stage of the game, given (4), the government chooses the en-
vironmental tax t to maximize social welfare. Solving this problem we obtain 
the following result.
Lemma 1: When the government sets an environmental tax and the public firm 




,  q0t =
52+34n+ 4n2
208+198n+ 45n2 +3n3







,  ait =
18+ 23n+3n2
208+198n+ 45n2 +3n3
,  π it =
3524+ 4988n+ 2469n2 + 450n3 + 27n4
208+198n+ 45n2 +3n3( )2
,
π0t =
15184+ 21392n+10528n2 +1916n3 +115n4
4 208+198n+ 45n2 +3n3( )2
,  CSt =
52+ 74n+30n2 +3n3( )2
2 208+198n+ 45n2 +3n3( )2
,
PSt =
15184+35488n+30480n2 +11792n3 +1915n4 +108n5
4 208+198n+ 45n2 +3n3( )2
,  EDt =
52+56n+ 7n2( )2
4 208+198n+ 45n2 +3n3( )2
,
Tt =
18+ 23n+3n2( ) 52+56n+ 7n2( )
208+198n+ 45n2 +3n3( )2
,  Wt =
52+80n+33n2 +3n3
416+396n+90n2 +6n3
,  i =1,  …,n.
Next, we consider that the government privatizes the public firm, so there is 
a private oligopoly. Let superscript P denote that the public firm is privatized, 
which means that there are n+1 private firms competing in the market. In the 
third stage each firm i chooses qi and ai to maximize its own profit given by (1). 
Solving this problem, we obtain:
(5)  qi =
1− t
4+ n
,  ai =
t
2
,  i = 0,  1,  …,n.
It is easy to show that, given n, when the environmental tax t increases, the 
extent to which qi decreases is less in this case than in the mixed oligopoly.
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In the second stage the government chooses environmental tax t to maximize 
the social welfare given by (3). Solving this problem, we obtain the following 
result.
Lemma 2: When the government sets an environmental tax and the public firm 
is privatized, in equilibrium,
tP =













313+ 454n+ 235n2 + 46n3 +3n4
58+58n+14n2 + n3( )2
,  EDt
P =
1+ n( )2 7+ n( )2




1+ n( )2 12+8n+ n2( )2
2 58+58n+14n2 + n3( )2
,  PSt
P =
1+ n( ) 313+ 454n+ 235n2 + 46n3 +3n4( )




2 1+ n( ) 7+ n( ) 5+ 7n+ n2( )
58+58n+14n2 + n3( )2
,   Wt
P =
14+ 23n+10n2 + n3
2 58+58n+14n2 + n3( )
,  i = 0,  1,  …,n.
Next we study whether the government privatizes the public firm or not. By 
comparing the social welfare obtained in the private and mixed oligopolies we 
find that Wt
P ≥Wt  if and only if n ≥ nt , where nt = 105 −1( ) / 2 ≈ 4 .6.  Thus, the 
following result is obtained.
Proposition 1 (Bárcena-Ruiz and Garzón, 2006): In equilibrium, under an en-
vironmental tax the government privatizes the public firm if and only if n ≥ nt .
Proof: See Appendix
As in Bárcena-Ruiz and Garzón (2006), we compare the results obtained in 
the mixed and private oligopolies and obtain that the output of industry is greater 
in the mixed oligopoly since the government cares about the consumer surplus, 
which leads to a greater consumer surplus in the mixed oligopoly CSt >CSt
P( ) .
The public firm produces more than each firm in the private oligopoly, 
which means that the public firm abates and emits more than each private firm. 
Moreover, the private firms in the mixed oligopoly produce, abate, and emit less 
than in the private oligopoly. Compared with the case of the private oligopoly, 
the higher emission level of the public firm offsets the lower emission level of 
the private firms, and thus total emissions are greater in the mixed oligopoly. 
This means the greater environmental damage is obtained in the mixed oligopoly 
EDt > EDt
P( ) .
Raising the environmental tax reduces the output of the private firms. Moreover, 
given that they have to compete with a public firm the private firms reduce their 
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output further in the mixed oligopoly than in the private one. As a result, the 
government levies a lower tax in the mixed oligopoly t < tP( ) . However, total 
taxes collected by the government are greater in the mixed oligopoly Tt > Tt
P( )  
since total emissions are greater in that case.
As the public firm is more aggressive in the product market than the private 
firms, private firms obtain more profit in the private oligopoly. Moreover, the 
profit of the public firm is reduced due to quadratic production and abatement 
costs. As a result, the producer surplus is greater in the private oligopoly than 
in the mixed oligopoly PSt
P > PSt( ) .
Comparing the welfare obtained in the two cases we find that when market 
competition is weak n < nt( )  the government does not privatize the public firm 
since this would further reduce market competition. The greater consumer 
surplus and total taxes collected by the government in the mixed oligopoly 
CSt > PSt
P  and Tt > Tt
P( )  offset the lower producer surplus and the greater en-
vironmental damage PSt < PSt
P  and EDT > EDt
P( ) . When the market is more 
competitive n > nt( )  the government privatizes the public firm even though 
competition is reduced, since the effects of the lower environmental damage 
and greater producer surplus dominate.
Next, we analyze the government’s decision on whether to privatize the public 
firm by assuming that the government sets an emission standard.
4. Emission Standard
Let subscript s denote that the government sets an emission standard to 
control pollution. We consider first that the government does not privatize the 
public firm. When the government sets an emission standard, firms reduce their 
pollutant emissions by an amount sufficient to exactly meet the standard, since 
abating emissions is expensive. In the third stage of the game, private firm i 
chooses qi so as to maximize its profit function, given by (2). The public firm 
chooses q0 so as to maximize the social welfare function given by (3). Solving 
these problems, we obtain:
(6)  q0 =  
5+10s
25+ 4n
,  qi =  
4+8s
25+ 4n
,   i =  1,  …,n.
In the second stage of the game the government chooses the emission standard 
s that maximizes social welfare. Solving this problem we obtain the following.
Lemma 3: When the government sets an emission standard and the public firm 
is not privatized, in equilibrium,
s =
125+136n+16n2
1000+ 2003n+1225n2 + 248n3 +16n4
,  q0s =
5 25+ 4n( ) 1+ n( ) 2+ n( )
1000+ 2003n+1225n2 + 248n3 +16n4
,
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qis =
4 25+ 4n( ) 1+ n( ) 2+ n( )
1000+ 2003n+1225n2 + 248n3 +16n4
,  CSs =
5+ 4n( )2 25+ 4n( )2 2+3n+ n2( )2
2 1000+ 2003n+1225n2 + 248n3 +16n4( )2
,
π0s =
109375+381000n+506954n2 +322748n3 +101394n4 +14800n5 +800n6
1000+ 2003n+1225n2 + 248n3 +16n4( )2
,
π is =
104375+364400n+ 485776n2 +309664n3 +97328n4 +14208n5 + 768n6
1000+ 2003n+1225n2 + 248n3 +16n4( )2
,
PSs =
109375+ 485375n+871354n2 +808524n3 + 411058n4 +112128n5 +15008n6 + 768n7
1000+ 2003n+1225n2 + 248n3 +16n4( )2
,
EDs =
125+ 261n+152n2 +16n3( )2
1000+ 2003n+1225n2 + 248n3 +16n4( )2
,  Ws =
250+647n+565n2 +184n3 +16n4
2000+ 4006n+ 2450n2 + 496n3 +32n4
,  i =1,  …,n.
Under a private oligopoly, in the third stage of the game firm i chooses qi so 
as to maximize its profit function given by (2). Solving, we obtain:
(7)  qi  =
1+ 2s
6+ n
,  i = 0,  1,  …,n.
In the second stage of the game the government chooses the standard s that 
maximizes social welfare. Solving this problem we obtain the following.
Lemma 4: When the government sets an emission standard and the public firm 
is privatized, in equilibrium,
  
sP = 7+ n
58+ 58n +14n2 + n3
,  qis
P = qit
P ,  CSs
P = CSt
P ,  π is
P = π it
P + tP qit




P ,  EDs
P = EDt
P ,  Ws
P = Wt
P ,  i = 0,  1,  …,n.
This Lemma shows that under an emission standard the producer surplus, 
the environmental damage, the consumer surplus and social welfare are the 
same as those obtained under environmental taxes. This is because firms are 
identical (see Helfand, 1999).
Next we study whether the government privatizes the public firm or not. By 
comparing the social welfare obtained in the private and mixed oligopolies we 
find that Ws
P ≥Ws  if and only if n ≥ ns , where ns = 3 14 −1( ) / 2 ≈ 5 .1.  Thus, the 
following result is obtained.
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Proposition 2: In equilibrium, under an emission standard the government 
privatizes the public firm if and only if n ≥ ns 9.
Proof: See Appendix.
As under taxes, the output of industry is greater in the mixed oligopoly 
than in the private oligopoly because the government cares about the consumer 
surplus. This means that the greater consumer surplus is obtained in the mixed 
oligopoly CSs > CSs
P( ) ,  while the greater producer surplus is obtained in the 
private oligopoly PSs
P > PSs( ).
Under an environmental tax firms have to pay a tax per unit of pollutant 
emitted. This means that the firms that produce more abate more emissions 
and pay more taxes, and the total emissions of public and private firms differ 
(since the public firm pollutes more). However, under an emission standard the 
government sets the same total emission level for all firms. When the number 
of private firms is low, market competition is also low in the private oligopoly. 
In the mixed oligopoly the public firm increases market competition by raising 
its output. As the output and thus the gross emissions of the public firm are high 
compared to those of the firms in the private oligopoly, there is a higher stan-
dard in the mixed oligopoly i.e. s > sP( ) . When n increases market competition 
also increases and the output of the public firm decreases. Thus, the output and 
gross emissions of the public firm are not so high as those of the firms in the 
private oligopoly. As a result, when n is high n > ns( )  the decrease in the output 
of the public firm implies that the standard is higher in the private oligopoly 
i.e. s < sP( ) . Therefore s > sP  if and only if n < ns .  As environmental damage 
depends positively on total emissions, environmental damage is greater in the 
mixed oligopoly if n is low EDs > EDs
P  if n < ns( ).
Comparing the welfare obtained in the two cases we find that when market 
competition is low n < ns( )  the government does not privatize the public firm, 
since this would further reduce market competition. The greater consumer 
surplus in the mixed oligopoly CSs > CSs
P( )  offsets the lower producer surplus 
and the greater environmental damage PSs
P > PSs  and EDs
P < EDs( ).  When n is 
high n > ns( )  the government privatizes the public firm, since the increase in 
the producer surplus dominates the reduction in market competition and the 
increase in environmental damage now EDs
P > EDs( ).
9 There are examples of privatization in industries where competition is strong. For ex-
ample, worldwide competition in the steel sector is strong due to the behaviour of Asian 
companies. In this sector, the Mexican government privatized the steel firm Sidermex 
(Lovei and Gentry, 2002, pp. 69). The obligations to undertake the actions to comply with 
the existing Mexican environmental requirements were transferred to the buyers as part 
of the privatization contracts.
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5. Comparison of results
In the first stage of the game the government maximizes social welfare by 
deciding on privatization and choosing its environmental policy instrument. 
Before solving stage 1, a comparison of the social welfare obtained in the mixed 
oligopoly under an environmental tax and under an emission standard reveals 
that Ws ≥Wt  if and only if n ≥ nts ,  where nts = 21−1( ) / 2 ≈ 1 .8.  Thus, the fol-
lowing result is obtained.
Proposition 3: In equilibrium, under a mixed oligopoly the government sets an 
emission standard if n ≥ nts ,  otherwise it sets an environmental tax.
10
Proof: See Appendix
In the mixed oligopoly the public firm produces more than the private firms 
since it cares about the consumer surplus. With a tax per unit of pollutant emit-
ted, firms that produce and pollute more pay more taxes. However, under an 
emission standard all the firms face the same restriction on emissions. Firms 
therefore cannot produce as much as under taxes since their pollutant emissions 
are upper bounded and their abatement costs are quadratic. Under a tax, firms 
can produce and pollute more by paying more taxes to avoid abating emissions. 
As a result, under an emission standard the output of the public firm is lower 
and thus the output of each private firm is greater than under a tax. The lower 
output of the public firm dominates and, as a result, the output of industry is 
greater under a tax. As the consumer surplus increases with the output of in-
dustry, the greatest consumer surplus is obtained when the government sets an 
environmental tax CSt >CSs( ).
Under an environmental tax firms may pollute more by paying more taxes, 
but under an emission standard this is not possible since pollutant emissions 
are upper bounded. Thus, under a tax total emissions are greater than under a 
standard. As the environmental damage depends positively on total emissions, 
it is greater under a tax EDt > EDs( ).  Given that the output of industry is greater 
under a tax than under a standard market competition is greater in the former 
case. Therefore, the profit of each firm is greater when the government sets a 
standard to control pollution, which means that PSs > PSt .
Comparing the welfare obtained in the mixed oligopoly with the two en-
vironmental policy instruments we find that when market competition is low 
n < nts( )  the government sets an environmental tax to control pollution. In this 
case the greater consumer surplus CSt >CSs( )  and the taxes levied by the gov-
ernment Tt > 0( )  between them offset the lower producer surplus PSt < PSs( )  
and the greater environmental damage EDt > EDs( ).  When n is high n > nts( )  the 
10 The main result obtained in this proposition holds if we consider that the objective func-
tion of the government is a weighted welfare function (see Appendix).
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government sets an emission standard, since the greater producer surplus and 
the lower environmental damage offset the lower consumer surplus.
It is shown in the Lemma 4 that Wt
P =Ws
P .  From Propositions 1 to 3, the 
first stage of the game can be solved, with the following result.
Proposition 4: In equilibrium, the government does not privatize the public firm 
and sets an environmental tax if n < nts . The government does not privatize and 
sets an emission standard if nts ≤ n < ns .  Finally, the government privatizes and 
is indifferent between an environmental tax and an emission standard if n ≥ ns 11.
According to Propositions 1 and 2, the government does not privatize the 
public firm when n is low: under a tax when n < nt  and under a standard when 
n < ns .  Moreover, Proposition 3 shows that when the government does not 
privatize the public firm it sets a tax if n < nts  and a standard if nts ≤ n < ns .  
Finally, if n ≥ ns  the public firm is privatized, and in that case the same welfare 
is obtained with the two environmental policy instruments.
6. Conclusions
Since the 1980’s there has been a worldwide wave of privatization of public 
firms. In many countries where public firms have been privatized the govern-
ments use environmental policies to control pollution. Economic literature on 
optimal environmental taxes and emission standards in a mixed market has 
considered a mixed duopoly and thus cannot analyze how environmental policy 
instruments affect government decisions on privatization. To fill this gap in the 
literature, this paper analyzes the interaction between the decision on whether 
to privatize a public firm in a mixed oligopoly and the setting of environmental 
taxes or standards by the government.
We find that the result depends on market competition, measured by the 
number of private firms. The government does not privatize the public firm when 
market competition is low. In that case it is not true that the government always 
prefers a tax or a standard. We find that when the number of private firms is low 
the government sets an environmental tax, but when the number of private firms 
is intermediate it sets an emission standard. Finally, when market competition is 
high the government privatizes the public firm but is indifferent between a tax 
and a standard since both environmental instruments generate the same welfare.
11 The main result obtained in this proposition holds if we consider that the objective func-
tion of the government a weighted welfare function (see Appendix).
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:
qit − qit
P = −
2+ n( ) 4+ n( ) 22+ n 10+ n( )( )




520+ 772n+388n2 + 76n3 +5n4
58+58n+14n2 + n3( ) 208+198n+ 45n2 +3n3( )
> 0,
t − tP = −
2 2+ n( ) −2+ n 5+ n( ) 7+ n( )( )
58+58n+14n2 + n3( ) 208+198n+ 45n2 +3n3( )
< 0,
T −TP =
2+ n( ) 60112+92400n+ 43136n2 +51786n3 +68138n4 +36670n5 +9740n6 +1382n7 +101n8 +3n9( )
58+58n+14n2 + n3( )2 208+198n+ 45n2 +3n3( )2
> 0,
π it −π it
P = −
2+ n( ) 843448+ 2045244n+ 2102194n2 +1186537n3 +397228n4 +80664n5 +9748n6 +645n7 +18n8( )





4 58+58n+14n2 + n3( )2 208+198n+ 45n2 +3n3( )2
< 0,  where
A =1543776+6387664n+10519008n2 +9263936n3 + 4829940n4 +1544164n5 +304556n6 +36084n7 + 2354n8 +65n9,
EDt −EDt
P =
2+ n( ) 52+56n+56n2 +14n3 + n4( ) 5928+12364n+8596n2 + 2400n3 + 292n4 +13n5( )




2+ n( )2 260+ 256n+66n2 +5n3( ) 2756+5544n+3794n2 +1067n3 +132n4 +6n5( )




2+ n( )2 −26+ n+ n2( )
2 58+ n 58+ n 14+ n( )( )( ) 208+3n 66+ n 15+ n( )( )( )
> 0 if and only if n > nt = 105 −1( ) / 2 ≈ 4 .6.
Proof of Proposition 2:
qis − qis
P = −
2+ n( ) 200+ 490n+ 297n2 +61n3 + 4n4( )




1+ n( ) 2+ n( ) 1250+ n 1192+5n 57+ 4n( )( )( )
58+58n+14n2 + n3( ) 1000+ 2003n+1225n2 + 248n3 +16n4( )
> 0,
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π is −π is
P =
−B
58+58n+14n2 + n3( )2 1000+ 2003n+1225n2 + 248n3 +16n4( )2
< 0,  where
B = 2+ n( ) 15941250+ 76140075n+153362604n2 +170048590n3 +114214642n4 + 48453923n5 +(
13195660n6 + 2295187n7 + 246192n8 +14832n9 +384n10 ) > 0,
CSs −CSs
P =
1+ n( )2 2+ n( )2 1250+1192n+ 285n2 + 20n3( ) 13250+ 27228n+18991n2 +5446n3 +688n4 +32n5( )
2 58+58n+14n2 + n3( )2 1000+ 2003n+1225n2 + 248n3 +16n4( )2
> 0,
PSs −PSs
P = − 1+ n( ) 2+ n( ) 7531250+ 44013875n+101823108n2 +124420454n3 +89533074n4 +((
39900619n5 +11258736n6 + 2009813n7 + 219806n8 +13440n9 +352n10 )) /
58+58n+14n2 + n3( )2 1000+ 2003n+1225n2 + 248n3 +16n4( )2( ) < 0,
EDs −EDs
P = −
1+ n( )2 2+ n( ) −125+ 4n+ 4n2( ) 14250+30159n+ 21144n2 +5918n3 + 720n4 +32n5( )
58+58n+14n2 + n3( )2 1000+ 2003n+1225n2 + 248n3 +16n4( )2
> 0 if
n < ns = 3 14 −1( ) / 2 ≈ 5 .1.
s− sP = −
2+ n( ) −125+ 4n 1+ n( )( )
58+58n+14n2 + n3( ) 1000+ 2003n+1225n2 + 248n3 +16n4( )
> 0 if n < ns
Ws −Ws
P = −
1+ n( ) 2+ n( )2 −125+ 4n 1+ n( )( )
2 58+58n+14n2 + n3( ) 1000+ 2003n+1225n2 + 248n3 +16n4( )
< 0 if n < ns .
Proof of Proposition 3:
q0s − q0t = −
n 2+ n( ) 1168+ n 1367+ n 488+ n 73+ 4n( )( )( )( )
208+198n+ 45n2 +3n3( ) 1000+ 2003n+1225n2 + 248n3 +16n4( )
< 0,
qis − qit =
2+ n( ) 800+ n 868+ n 287+ n 53+ 4n( )( )( )( )
208+198n+ 45n2 +3n3( ) 1000+ 2003n+1225n2 + 248n3 +16n4( )
> 0,
Qs −Qt = −
n 2+ n( ) 368+ n 499+ n 201+ 20n( )( )( )
208+198n+ 45n2 +3n3( ) 1000+ 2003n+1225n2 + 248n3 +16n4( )
< 0,
π is −π it = 991680000+5257417600n+11854281848n
2 +14892708672n3 +11500695810n4 +(
5705914822n5 +1857681899n6 + 400145932n7 +56506565n8 +5036560n9 + 257424n10 +5760n11) /
208+198n+ 45n2 +3n3( )2 1000+ 2003n+1225n2 + 248n3 +16n4( )2( ) > 0,
PSs −PSt = 3744000000+ 23717952000n+65288187168n
2 +102545248640n3 +101611147548n4 +(
66465039700n5 + 29289422009n6 +8758319342n7 +1773361741n8 + 239157444n9 + 20580520n10 +
1023360n11+ 22400n12 ) / 4 208+198n+ 45n2 +3n3( )2 1000+ 2003n+1225n2 + 248n3 +16n4( )2( ) > 0,
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CSs −CSt = −n 2+ n( )
2 368+ 499n+ 201n2 + 20n3( )(52000+151788n+165345n2 +83513n3 + 20066n4 +
2256n5 +96n6 ) / 2 208+198n+ 45n2 +3n3( )2 1000+ 2003n+1225n2 + 248n3 +16n4( )2( ) < 0.
EDs −EDt = −n 2+ n( ) 1040+1995n+1217n
2 + 248n3 +16n4( ) 104000+318232n+360706n2 +186605n3 +(
44877n4 + 4984n5 + 208n6 ) /   4 208+198n+ 45n2 +3n3( )2 1000+ 2003n+1225n2 + 248n3 +16n4( )2( ) < 0,
Ws −Wt =
2n 2+ n( )2 −5+ n+ n2( )
208+198n+ 45n2 +3n3( ) 1000+ 2003n+1225n2 + 248n3 +16n4( )
> 0 if n > nts = 21−1( ) / 2 ≈ 1 .8.
Weighted welfare function: We consider now that the social welfare function is 
given by the following function: W =αCS +PS +T −ED . Therefore, we consider 
a weighted welfare function, where a is the weight attached to the consumer 
surplus. We assume that 5 >α ≥1  to assure that the output of the firms, the 
emission level and the critical values of n are positive in all the cases. Solving 
similarly to when α =1, , we obtain:
Wt =
2+ n( ) 13 5−α( )− 2n2 1−5α +α2( )+ 2n 29−α −α2( )( )
2 6n3 + n2 110− 20α( )+ 26 5−α( )2 + n 580− 201α +17α2( )( )
,
Ws =
2+3n+ n2( ) 25 6−α( )+ 4n 35−α2( )− 4n2 1−6α +α2( )( )




2+3n+ n2( ) 6+α + nα( )
2 60+14n2 + n3 + 2n 30−α( )− 2α( )
,  Ws
P =
2+3n+ n2( ) 6+α + nα( )
2 60+14n2 + n3 + 2n 30−α( )− 2α( )
.
By comparing the welfare obtained in the different cases, we obtain the 
following:
i) Wt
P ≥Wt  if and only if n ≥ ntα ,  where ntα = 131− 26α −1( ) / 2,
ii) Ws
P ≥Ws  if and only if n ≥ nsα ,  where nsα = 151− 25α −1( ) / 2,
iii) Ws ≥Wt  if and only if n ≥ ntsα ,  where ntsα = 31−11α +α
2 −1( ) / 2,
iv) nsα > ntα > ntsα  > 0 for 5 >α ≥1.
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